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TTIP Negotiations and Public Procurement: Internal Federalist Tensions 
and External Risks of Marginalisation 
 
MARIA ANNA CORVAGLIA 
 
Abstract 
Government procurement is perhaps one of the most underexplored areas in the recent 
academic literature on transatlantic economic relations, yet it is also one of the most protected 
economic sectors addressed in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
negotiations. Even though the European (EU) and the United States have undertaken 
extensive reciprocal procurement commitments under the World Trade Organization’s 
Agreement on Government Procurement, as well as in their respective preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs), the liberalisation and harmonisation of the transatlantic procurement 
market could not be more ambiguous or controversial. This article aims to deepen our 
understanding of crucial aspects of the current EU–United States procurement relationship. 
To this end, the article explores the TTIP negotiations as well as similar PTAs and underlines 
the potential implications in terms of the fragmentation of the international discipline of 
procurement regulation.  
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Government procurement has thus far received only very limited attention in the scholarly 
literature on European Union (EU)–United States economic relations.
1
 At the same time it is 
arguably one of the most protected economic sectors in both the EU and the United States and 
hence is one of the thorniest issues addressed during the negotiations on the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement. 
 To be sure, both the EU and the United States have made considerable efforts to bring 
their respective procurement markets in line with reciprocal procurement commitments under 
                                                        
1
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the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), and have included procurement 
provisions in their respective preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with other trading 
partners. However, the liberalisation and harmonisation of the transatlantic procurement 
market could not be more ambiguous or controversial. ‘Buy American’ rules, as well as local 
and domestic content requirements in the United States’ awarding of public contracts, are key 
issues on the TTIP negotiating table. At the same time, fundamental institutional aspects of 
the United States and EU procurement systems impede the progress of procurement 
negotiations, resulting in federal tensions particularly regarding the coverage of these 
commitments. If the EU procurement regime has been reformed and uniformed between the 
Member States (thanks to the new 2014/24/EU and 2014/25/EU Directives), the coverage of 
US central and sub-central procurement authorities – including states and cities – is very 
limited and their coverage requires substantial reform even for the authorisation of their 
negotiating powers. 
 This article takes stock of this fragmented regulatory framework and aims to deepen 
our understanding of crucial aspects of the current EU–United States procurement 
relationship. To this end it explores the TTIP negotiations as well as similar PTAs signed by 
both trading partners and underlines the implications in terms of the fragmentation of the 
international discipline of procurement. More precisely, the article analyses how the public 
procurement provisions negotiated in the TTIP offer potential regulatory transformations 
compared with the procurement commitments previously negotiated and concluded in PTAs 
and under the GPA, and, for this reason, how their negotiation also gives rise to increasing 
domestic and local tensions.  
The article proceeds by analysing the TTIP procurement negotiations from three 
perspectives. First, on the horizontal plane, the article conducts a comparative analysis of, on 
the one hand, the various international multilateral and preferential procurement regulations 
currently in place, and on the other, the TTIP negotiations, observing potential differences 
between existing regulations and the regulatory dynamics experienced now in TTIP. Second, 
examining the system vertically, the article aims to disaggregate the different levels of 
economic governance – from central to sub-central government entities – in transatlantic 
procurement, thus unravelling its complexity and federalist tensions. Third, oriented 
systemically, the article highlights some broader implications of the TTIP for public 
procurement: the likely expansion of the EU–United States procurement commitments 




procurement regimes – no longer coherent with the WTO procurement regulations – and the 
greater isolation of developing countries.  
 
2 Procurement Chapters in Preferential Trade Agreements: The 
Regulatory Landscape Before the TTIP 
In order to fully appreciate and understand the relevance of the procurement negotiations in 
the TTIP, this section first analyses the regulatory treatment that public procurement has 
received until now in PTAs. Second, it addresses the relationship between the regulation of 
public procurement in PTAs and the WTO’s GPA. Finally, it focuses on the existence of other 
instruments of procurement regulation at the international level, particularly the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law. 
 
2.1 Procurement Commitments in PTAs and the Framework of the Discussion 
On average, public procurement accounts for 15–20% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 
both developed and developing countries and is one of the least liberalised sectors in the 
realm of trade policy.
2
 At the multilateral and regional levels, however, considerable efforts 
have been made to liberalise the public procurement sectors. In the context of the WTO, the 
GPA has introduced in its signatory parties’ domestic procurement regulation the principle of 
non-discrimination, together with some minimum standards of transparency and fairness in 
how the procurement activities are conducted.
3
 
 Alongside such plurilateral efforts, an increasing number of PTAs have included 
various chapters and provisions that explicitly address the regulation of government 
procurement activities. These regulations are aimed at the liberalisation of the public 
procurement market between their contracting parties. In terms of their general regulatory 
purposes, procurement chapters in preferential trade negotiations aim to achieve three main 
objectives: i) opening international procurement markets; ii) increasing transparency and 
competitiveness in national procurement regulations; and iii) ensuring reciprocal market-
access commitments.
4
 However, the actual procurement commitments in PTAs vary 
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considerably in terms of coverage, types of provisions and trade significance. 
 One general observation about the landscape of PTAs’ procurement regulations is 
that, of all the PTAs notified by the WTO Secretariat between 2000 and 2010, they generally 
fall into three identifiable categories of bilateral trade agreements: PTAs with no provisions 
on government procurement; PTAs with a single or few provisions; and PTAs with a detailed 
regulation of the government procurement sector.
5
 According to the latest WTO data, 37% of 
the PTAs in force include no procurement provisions, 35% of the agreements merely have 
aspirational provisions (simply encouraging further liberalisation of the procurement sector), 




 The literature that has analysed the preferential trade agreements including 
procurement provisions has thus far concentrated on three main aspects. First there is the level 
of commitments included in the PTAs’ procurement provisions. The determination of the 
coverage of the procurement commitments is a crucial reference in evaluating the preferential 
negotiations on public procurement.
7
 The coverage – specifically the thresholds, the 
governmental entities included and the goods and construction services listed in the PTAs’ 
parties’ schedules of commitments – is fundamental to the evaluation of the procurement 
market access commitments that have been negotiated and concluded on a preferential basis. 
Only the contextual evaluation of the minimum volume of procurement value, the 
governmental bodies and the lists of goods and services of the procurement activities 
concerned in the negotiations can provide a balanced evaluation of the market access 
commitments reached in the PTAs’ procurement chapters.
8
 
 A second crucial variable is the typology of the procurement commitments.
9
 To date, 
various types of provisions have been frequently included in the procurement chapters of 
PTAs: for instance, non-discrimination provisions guaranteeing national treatment and most-
favoured-nation treatment, procedural rules similar to the GPA, requirements for the 
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implementation of bid challenge procedures and dispute settlement procedures, regulation of 
offsets, commitments on further negotiations, and accession to the GPA.  
 Third, a crucial variable in this analysis is the relationship of these preferential 
procurement regulations to the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement. This will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following section. 
 
2.2 The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and Its Relevance to PTAs  
As stated above, an important aspect to take into consideration when studying procurement 
provisions in PTAs is the relationship with the GPA and the other preferential procurement 
instruments.  
 Research has shown that there is a clear correlation between the presence of detailed 
procurement chapters in PTAs and the GPA membership of the parties to the PTAs. The 
PTAs that include the most detailed provisions on the conduct of the procurement process can 
rely on there being at least one GPA member between the contracting parties.
10
 Further, the 
1994 WTO Government Procurement Agreement, the Revised Agreement, its preparatory 
drafts or the negotiating offers put forward by the strongest GPA parties are frequently used 
as models for the negotiation of the detailed procurement provisions in PTAs, between both 
GPA and non-GPA parties. Moreover, in the case of detailed procedural provisions, on 
average the PTAs concluded between 2000 and 2010 tend to incorporate and explicitly refer 
to the procedural discipline already agreed in international procurement agreements 
(essentially the 1994 GPA text) in order to avoid conflicting obligations.
11
  
 Recent OECD data shows that, overall, the level of procurement commitment reached 
in PTAs does not excessively diverge from the regulatory level reached in the GPA, 
particularly in terms of the coverage of entities and thresholds.
12
 In general, non-GPA parties 
have achieved in their PTAs a comparable level of market access commitments and a 
harmonisation of the domestic procurement legislation to GPA standards – and, in the case of 
procurement liberalisation in Latin American PTAs and in services coverage commitments, 
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 In the context of the analysis of the convergence between PTAs and GPA procurement 
commitments, the conclusion of the renegotiation on the Revised Text of the GPA represents 
an important point of reference. The renegotiation process started in 1994 pursuant to GPA 
Article XXIV:7(b), but it could only be concluded in December 2011.
14
 The adoption of the 
Ministerial Decision GPA/113 of 2 April 2012, consolidating the lists of commitments and 
the revised GPA text, represents a milestone in the development of the regulatory framework 
of public procurement at the multilateral level. Two aspects in the revised GPA text assume 
crucial importance in this discussion. One is the substantial increase in coverage in the revised 
schedules of commitments’, with central, local and sub-national government authorities being 
now included in the GPA schedules of commitments by many parties and in particular the 
EU.
15
 The other is the harmonisation of the wording of the WTO Agreement with other 
international instruments of procurement regulation: the GPA Revised Text recognises the 
importance of increasing clarity and flexibility in international procurement regulation, 
following the wording and the flexibilities of provisions included in the UNCITRAL Model 
Law. The latter will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
2.3 International Regulation of Public Procurement Outside the GPA Agreement  
With regards to the possible multilateralisation and harmonisation of the preferential and 
plurilateral discipline of public procurement, a crucial role has been played so far by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services, adopted in 
1994 and reformed in 2011.  
 The UNCITRAL Model Law provides a highly articulate template supporting 
countries in modernising and improving their national procurement systems, oriented to the 
achievement of efficiency and competition.
16
 The Model Law is not a binding agreement but 
a traditional soft law instrument, which the parties are free to follow, fully or partially, in 
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 For this reason the UNCITRAL Model Law represents a 
powerful tool in gradually reforming national procurement regulation, suggesting modern and 
efficient procurement regulatory solutions and offering great flexibility when it comes to the 
choice of possible procurement methods. Thus, the Model Law is widely recognised as a 
‘global standard’ for good governance in the regulation of government procurement.
18
 
 Because it is a non-binding standard framework for the evaluation and modernisation 
of national procurement legislation, the UNCITRAL Model Law is frequently used as the 
basis for domestic procurement reforms in many transitioning economies and in the former 
Soviet Republics and CIS countries.
19
 More recently, the UNCITRAL Model Law has been at 
the centre of the modernisation of domestic procurement systems in developing countries and 
African countries, often invoked as a condition by major international donor institutions such 
as the World Bank. 
 Parallel to the WTO renegotiations on government procurement, the UNCITRAL 
Working Group on Procurement simultaneously successfully finalised the reform of the 
Model Law in 2011.
20
 The convergence in the wording and regulation offered by the 2011 
UNCITRAL Model Law and the 2012 Revised GPA text is an important indication of a 
process of progressive harmonisation of the procurement regulations between the different 
international instruments of procurement negotiations.
21
 Moreover, the increased coherence 
between these two international disciplines of public procurement has also opened new 
scenarios for future accessions to the GPA and the possible extension of its limited 
membership beyond the plurilateral status of the GPA in the WTO architecture.  
 
3 Regulation of Public Procurement Between the TTIP Parties: Internal 
and External Public Procurement Regulations 
The overview in the previous section of the various preferential and international instruments 
                                                        
17
 John Linarelli, ‘The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement and the UNCITRAL Model Procurement 
Law: A View from Outside the Region’ (2006) 1 Asian Journal of WTO & International Health Law and Policy 
317. 
18
 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Public Procurement: An Appraisal of the UNCITRAL Model Law as a Global Standard’ 
(2004) 53 The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 17. 
19
 Maria Anna Corvaglia, ‘Accession of Post-Soviet Republics to the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement: Commitments and Expectations for Developing Countries’ (in Russian) (2014) 7 ICTSD Мосты 8 
<www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/Mosty_October4.pdf> accessed 14.11.2015. 
20
 Caroline Nicholas, ‘The 2011 UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement’ (2012) 21(3) Public 
Procurement Law Review 111. 
21
 Caroline Nicholas, ‘Work of UNCITRAL on Government Procurement: Purpose, Objectives and 




of public procurement revealed that the TTIP negotiations on public procurement started in a 
fairly coherent and harmonised regulatory context. The procurement chapters included in the 
PTAs concluded up to 2010 were negotiated on the basis of the GPA. In this framework, 
PTAs work as vehicles for the diffusion of the GPA standards of transparency and 
competitiveness as well as for the harmonisation of commitments and coverage in the 
liberalisation of the international procurement markets. Moreover, the parallel reform and 
convergence of the GPA and the UNCITRAL Model Law cleared the path for a possible 




 Based on these preliminary general considerations, we will now explore in more detail 
the specific context of the TTIP procurement negotiations, looking at the internal and external 
regulatory framework of public procurement of the two TTIP negotiating parties.  
 
3.1 Regulatory Asymmetry Between the EU and US Internal Public Procurement 
Regulations  
Within the range of the various international instruments of procurement regulation – at 
international and regional level – the EU regulation of public procurement displays some 
unique characteristics. 
 First, the EU – as a model of regional trade integration at its most advanced – 
paradoxically belongs to the category of PTAs that do not address the field of government 
procurement at all (corresponding to around 37% of the PTAs registered in the WTO). It is 
worth noting that EU treaties do not contain any distinct public procurement provisions.
23
 The 
specific EU regulation of public procurement – probably the most evolved and coherent 
regional regulatory framework of procurement – has been developed only through secondary 
EU legal sources. Since the 1970s, EU Directives have progressively shaped, integrated and 
reformed the regulatory framework of public procurement in the European context.
24
 
 Second, the EU procurement regime represents an extremely coherent set of rules 
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founded on the regulation of the economic freedoms of the EU’s internal market, recently 
subject to an extensive reform. The current EU procurement regime is composed of two 
Directives (namely Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement and Directive 2014/245/EU 
on procurement in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors).
25
 This regulatory 
regime aims to guarantee the cohesion of public procurement across the Member States and in 
the Common Market through the establishment of the prohibition of discrimination, the 
principle of transparency and the removal of barriers to access.
26
 
 Third, in terms of implementation, the EU procurement framework represents an 
exceptionally coherent regulatory system. As the reformed 2014 EU procurement Directives 
had to be fully transposed by all the EU Member States by April 2016, the Member States 
progressively harmonised their domestic regulation of procurement activities above the EU 
thresholds and adopted the same regulatory procurement instruments covering supply, 
services and works contracts.
27
 
 Unfortunately, a comparable level of harmonisation does not exist in the US internal 
procurement system, either at the federal or state level. If the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation
28
 represents the main regulatory reference for the acquisition and procurement 
activities of the US Federal Government, the 50 US States each have their own public 
procurement regulations in place.
29
 The freedom of the US States to adopt preferential and 
distinctive procurement practices has been also confirmed in the jurisprudence of the US 
Supreme Court, particularly Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp in 1976, which equated the 
States with private actors procuring goods and services on the market.
30
  
 Moreover, the Federal Acquisition Regulation is applicable only when the state 
authorities are included in the schedules of commitments under the GPA. However, the 
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inclusion of US central and sub-central government entities under the GPA is very limited: 
only 37 US States are bound by GPA commitments,
31
 and only in their executive branch 
agencies or specific state departments. Construction services are very often excluded from the 
GPA coverage, and many other restrictions apply to the procurement activities covered, such 





3.2 External Procurement Regulations and the Precedents of the TTIP Procurement 
Chapter: Korea and CETA 
To complete the overview of the regulatory framework in which the TTIP negotiations began, 
it is important to integrate the internal discipline of public procurement with the EU’s and 
US’s external regulations of public procurement. Both transatlantic parties have a 
consolidated tradition of including public procurement in the negotiation of their preferential 
agreements. Thus, after the conclusion of the NAFTA, almost all the US preferential 
agreements contain substantive public procurement chapters,
33
 and, since the adoption in 
2006 of the strategy ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’, public procurement has been 
pursued as a priority in the EU external trade policy.
34
 More recently, the conclusion of 
comprehensive PTAs by the EU and the United States has paved the way for the launch of the 
ambitious TTIP negotiations on public procurement. The most relevant agreements are (for 
the US) the Korea–United States Agreement (KORUS) and (for the EU) the Korea–EU 
Agreement (KOREU) and the Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
the EU and Canada.
35
  
 It is interesting to observe that, in many respects, the KORUS and KOREU and their 
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 The ‘Global Europe’ strategy describes public procurement as “an area of significant untapped potential for 
EU exporters. EU companies are world leaders in areas such as transport equipment, public works and utilities. 
But they face discriminatory practices in almost all our trading partners, which effectively close off exporting 
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Commission of the European Communities, ‘Global Europe: Competing in the World’ COM(2006) 567 final 
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negotiating outcomes in the specific field of public procurement served as testing grounds for 
possible future TTIP negotiating dynamics in procurement liberalisation. With reference to 
the WTO, Korea has been a GPA signatory party since 1997 and both the agreements signed 
with the EU and the United States are grounded in the WTO regulatory framework of public 
procurement. Both the KOREU and KORUS incorporate the GPA standards of competition 
and transparency and, at the same time, both agreements include some ‘GPA+’ commitments.  
 In terms of coverage, the KOREU substantially increased the coverage of public 
contracts and public work concessions of many central and sub-national procuring authorities 
in Korea and the EU, alongside the extension of the coverage beyond conventional goods, 
services and construction compared with the respective GPA Commitments.
36
 However, any 
similar extension on the GPA standards achieved by the KORUS was limited to thresholds: 
even though it was at the centre of Korea’s negotiating requests, the procurement of federal 
authorities and government-owned enterprises was prevented from being included in the 
KORUS coverage by strong US opposition.
37
  
 The EU’s active negotiating position in enabling the liberalisation of public 
procurement beyond central governmental authorities was also demonstrated during the 
negotiation of the CETA concluded in September 2014. The EU’s negotiating objective was 
to secure the coverage of sub-federal entities, provinces and local territories, because Canada, 
similar to the US, had only included federal procurement in the GPA. It also excluded crown 
corporations – quasi-governmental bodies that represent a peculiar characteristic and a 
significant economic percentage of the Canadian procurement system.
38
 Procurement 
assumed an important role in the EU–Canada negotiations and the inclusion of the Canadian 
Provinces in any agreement on procurement was one of the EU’s conditions for opening the 
negotiations in 2010. In the CETA, the EU was therefore able to negotiate an extension of 
coverage to include Provinces and Territories as well as federal- and provincial-level crown 
corporations, facilitated by the adoption of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) extending 
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 It is worth noting that the preferential agreements concluded with Canada represent 
far-reaching models of preferential procurement regulation. The cross-border liberalisation of 
the procurement sector of the Canadian provinces, in fact, was included for the first time in 
the 2010 Canada–United States Agreement on Government Procurement, in exchange for 
substantial coverage of sub-central coverage and the non-application of the 2009 American 





4 TTIP and Public Procurement: Economic Opportunities and 
Institutional Challenges  
 
4.1 The Economic Relevance of Public Procurement in the TTIP Dynamic 
The importance of public procurement at the TTIP negotiating table is strictly related to the 
potential (in terms of economic impact) inherent in the liberalisation of the field of public 
procurement in bilateral trade relations across the Atlantic.  
 The size and relative openness of the EU and US procurement markets have 
progressively and recently attracted the attention of economic research.
41
 Even though the EU 
and the United States are both signatory parties of the GPA, the difference between their 
commitments under the GPA is extremely significant. According to an evaluation by the EU 
Commission, 95% of EU procurement activities are covered by the GPA rules of transparency 
and non-discrimination, while only 32% of the US procurement is bound by the WTO 
discipline because only 37 US States agreed to be included in the annexes of the GPA.
42
 In 
terms of reciprocal market access opportunities, the difference between the openness of the 
procurement markets is even more striking: only 3.2% of the US public procurement market 
appears to be open to EU suppliers, while the EU has offered open access to around 15% of 
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its public procurement’s market opportunities to US suppliers.
43
 
 Outside the respective GPA commitments, the US’s ‘Buy American’ provisions – the 
most famous example is the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, used as a strategic 
political economy instrument during periods of financial crisis – represents the most 
significant barrier to trade for EU producers and suppliers in the procurement field.  
 
4.2 The TTIP Negotiating Agenda on Public Procurement and Current Difficulties 
As stated above, public procurement is a crucial negotiating issue in the TTIP negotiations. 
From the outset the EU had a clear objective, as developed in the US–EU High Level 
Working Group (HLWG) on Jobs and Growth, to consolidate the TTIP negotiating mandate 
to ‘enhance business opportunities through substantially improved access to government 
procurement opportunities at all levels of government on the basis of national treatment’. 
During all the rounds of discussion and mediation, even up to the latest negotiation rounds 
(the eleventh was on 19–23 October 2015
44
 and the twelfth on 22–26 February 2016), public 
procurement has proven to be a consistently central issue. 
 From the opening of the TTIP talks, specific discussion about procurement market 
access during the negotiating rounds has been driven by the EU’s three negotiating 
objectives.
45
 The first of the EU’s requests was the abolition of restrictions in the United 
States that affect the market access of European suppliers (and their goods and services) and, 
in particular, the elimination of US domestic preferences in the procurement of federally 
funded infrastructure. Second, the expansion of market access commitments at both federal 




 The specific coverage commitments raised in the discussions thus far seem to go 
beyond the extent of the current US commitments under the GPA. As emerged from the 
HLWG initial document, the extension of the national treatment obligation to sub-federal, 
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state and city level represents already a consistent increase on the GPA commitments. And, as 
reported in 2009 before the start of the TTIP talks (and mentioned above), only 3.2% of the 
US public procurement market is currently open to EU suppliers.
47
 
Both the EU and the United States reported that in all the negotiating rounds, the 
starting point for the discussions around the table was the text of the GPA, to which both the 
EU and the United States are signatories. However, the clear intention of both parties was to 
build on the GPA rules and push for further liberalisation regarding the coverage of the 
reciprocal commitments. During the latest negotiating rounds, alongside the issue of 
coverage, the EU raised some questions that are even more clearly ‘GPA+’. The most evident 
example is the EU’s request for discussion on including environmental and social 
considerations in procurement procedures. And it is worth noting in this respect that the use 
of public procurement for socio-environmental purposes is one of the main characteristics of 
the 2014 reform of internal public procurement, which resulted in Directive 2014/24/EU on 
the public procurement sector and Directive 2014/25/EU on procurement by entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors.
48
 
With respect to the inclusion of non-economic considerations in public procurement 
regulations, the major difference between the TTIP negotiating agenda and the GPA Revised 
Text is the equal treatment of environmental and social policy objectives. One of the most 
acclaimed changes in the Revised GPA is its acknowledgement of the growing practice of the 
environmental use of public procurement.
49
 Article X.6 of the Revised GPA allows the 
procuring entities of the contracting parties to specifically ‘prepare, adopt or apply technical 
specifications to promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment’. 
While there is a clear textual reference to the implementation of environmental policy 
objectives, the instrumental use of public procurement for social and labour policy objectives 
is not explicitly mentioned in the Revised GPA regulation and is only included in the Future 
Work Program annexed to the Agreement.
50
 Contrary to the approach taken in the GPA, the 
TTIP negotiations seem to move in the direction of treating environmental and social 
considerations in public procurement regulations on an equal footing, setting a significant 
precedent of divergence from the WTO context, where considerations regarding social 
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4.3 Internal Institutional and ‘Federal’ Aspects of the TTIP Procurement Negotiations  
In an historical perspective, the TTIP negotiations can be interpreted as a new chapter in a 
longstanding institutional dialogue between the EU and the United States on public 
procurement.
52
 The institutional analysis of the current transatlantic negotiations, and 
particularly the specific area of public procurement, necessarily implies important 
considerations with regards to legitimacy, subsidiarity and domestic participation and, in 
broader terms, to federalism.
53
 
 As was explored earlier, the transatlantic dialogue between the legal and constitutional 
regimes of the EU and the United States has a very broad scope, embracing crucial trade and 
investment issues and involving different levels of trade and investment governance. Serious 
concerns about transparency and democratic legitimacy have been raised at various stages of 
these ambitious transformative transatlantic negotiations.
54
 From a more institutional 
perspective, a crucial aspect of this transatlantic dialogue consists in the involvement of the 
EU and US parliamentary bodies in both the negotiations and the ratification of the future 
transatlantic trade deal. The parliamentary organs’ lack of democratic involvement has been 
at the centre of strong criticism of the deficiency of democratic oversight in the TTIP 
negotiations.
55
 Yet both the European Parliament and US Congress seem to have the political 
and legal instruments to affect and block the developments of the transatlantic negotiations ‘in 
a fairly protectionist fashion’ and on the basis of mere domestic and national interest.
56
 
 On the European side, following the provisions set in Articles 207 and 218 in the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), TTIP requires the approval of the 
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European Parliament and European Council to ratify the final text.
57
 However, the EU 
negotiating position on the coverage of procurement liberalisation seems strictly linked to the 
coherence and harmonisation of internal procurement regulation in the European territory, 
used as an important instrument to enhance the cohesion of the internal common market.
58
 
The US congressional approval appears more problematic when it comes to public 
procurement negotiations: as an executive agreement, the majority in both Houses of 
Congress have to agree. Moreover, in June 2015 the US Congress granted to the US president 
the Trade Promotion Authority for the conduct of TTIP under specific guidelines and 
negotiating objectives.
59
 With regards to procurement regulatory practices, Congress asked 
for increased transparency in developing guidelines, rules, regulations and laws for 
government procurement. Yet even in a context of increased transparency in procurement 
negotiations, it cannot be denied that the biggest challenge is in garnering a congressional 
majority on the abolition of the ‘Buy American’ provisions and de facto preference for 
domestic producers in the award of federal contracts. 
 What makes the US Congress’s approval of the procurement negotiations within TTIP 
even more uncertain is the political difficulty in persuading state- and other sub-federal-level 
procurement entities to agree on the extension of the coverage of the transatlantic 
procurement liberalisation.
60
 As was shown in the conclusion of the EU–Canada agreement, 
the role of sub-federal levels of government has acquired an increasing importance in the 
development and conclusion of trade negotiation, particularly in the field of public 
procurement.  
 Usually disregarded in analyses of the negotiation of international trade agreements, 
the role of provincial and territorial governments has proven to be a crucial variable in 
achieving the final agreement on the text of the CETA, mainly based on the regular bilateral 
consultation conducted between the federal government and the Canadian provinces.
61
 A 
formal institutional mechanism of cooperation under the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT) 
was established to foster the intergovernmental cooperation between Canadian government, 
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provinces and local territories and to develop a coherent negotiating position.
62
 Further, 
thanks to the AIT system, it is particularly interesting to note that the (federal) Canadian 
Government forced some concessions from the EU in crucial industrial sectors (namely dairy 
and beef) – important at a provincial level – under the threat of the non-implementation of the 
CETA procurement provisions in the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, the largest 
procurement market for EU firms in Canada.
63
  
 It is very likely that similar political dynamics will play out in the TTIP procurement 
chapter negotiations, and with even fiercer political tensions given the lack of a formal federal 
type of trade coordination between the federal and state authorities. 
 
4.4 External Implications of the TTIP Negotiations on Third Countries 
Having examined in detail what the central issues in the TTIP negotiations of public 
procurement are, and having explored the main institutional difficulties faced by the EU and 
the US, we must now address the possible implications of these negotiations external to the 
TTIP negotiating parties. Even without knowing the exact outcome of these ongoing TTIP 
negotiations it is possible to envisage at least two major risks for third countries, alongside 
more systemic implications for the international regulatory framework of public procurement. 
 Apart from the political challenges and strategic considerations in terms of the shift of 
regulatory trade powers (issues that lie outside the scope of this article), it is clear that a future 
procurement chapter in the TTIP may carry the risk of causing significant negative 
implications for third parties. Neither can it be denied that, in fact, the first and most likely 
consequence of the TTIP procurement chapter can be measured in terms of its direct 
economic discriminatory effect. In line with the TTIP objectives on market access, future 
TTIP commitments on public procurement will have the effect of discriminating against the 
products and services originating from countries outside the transatlantic partnership, to be 
assessed on the basis of the rules of origin set in the future agreement.
64
 
However, the impact of the future TTIP procurement chapter’s discrimination against 
third parties must be evaluated, also taking into consideration a wide range of other factors 
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including the existence of preferential agreements between TTIP parties and other countries, 
the extension of the preferential procurement discipline between the parties, the national legal 
framework of public procurement in the external countries and the legal capacity for these 
countries to conform with the procurement regulatory standards adopted in the TTIP. All 
these variables seem to suggest that the impact of the transatlantic partnership not only 
manifests itself in economically discriminating against non-TTIP parties, but also involves a 
considerable risk of increasingly marginalising developing countries within the international 
regulatory architecture of public procurement, due to the reluctance of developing countries to 




First, as was seen in the WTO data on PTAs between 2000 and 2010 above, public 
procurement was deliberately excluded from the preferential agreements signed by 
developing countries.
66
 This, however, is not an incontrovertible trend and it could be 
changed in the future. As the EU has emerged as a ‘global regulator’ exporting its regulatory 
standards through preferential trade agreements, it is possible to speculate that it will try to 
export its approach to public procurement regulation in the PTAs to be negotiated after the 
TTIP with third parties. As proven in the emerging ‘new generation’ of EU agreements with 
Canada, South Korea and Singapore, the EU has constantly exported, through bilateral PTAs, 
the most stringent EU regulatory standards as a means of liberalising trade, for instance as 
regards competition, environmental and labour market regulation.
67
 Public procurement has 
been a crucial component of the conclusion of the recent bilateral agreements with Korea, 
CARICOM and Central America, suggesting the development of a ‘model of procurement 
liberalisation’ to be included also in the EU’s current negotiations with India, Vietnam, 
Malaysia, Japan and Thailand.
68
  
Second, developing countries have not only been hesitant to conclude preferential 
trade agreements with detailed procurement disciplines, they have been particularly reluctant 
to comply with the WTO discipline of public procurement. Regardless of the efforts during 
the GPA’s renegotiation to create incentives and flexibilities in the accession, the GPA is still 
perceived as a developed countries’ ‘club’ with no developing or emerging economies in the 
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 In this context, if the TTIP manages to reach even higher standards of non-
discrimination and transparency in the liberalisation and integration of the public procurement 
market, the risk of opening up an even larger regulatory gap between TTIP parties and 
developing countries is particularly significant. 
However, a few encouraging signs about GPA accession have recently emerged, 
significantly from some BRICS economies. While Brazil and South Africa are still yet to 




 have recently gained the 
status of GPA Observers, opening the possibility of future accession. Unfortunately it is very 
difficult to predict emerging countries’ chances of accession as the process has proven to be 
excessively lengthy, requiring the alignment of national procurement systems to the GPA 
regulatory standards of competition and transparency.
72
 China’s GPA accession process is 
emblematic: beginning in 2007, it is still blocked on issues of coverage and national 
compliance after various revised offers.
73
 
The lack of involvement in preferential and multilateral agreements regulating public 
procurement can be interpreted in the light of the regulatory difference that is emerging 
between GPA members and developing countries. This regulatory gap between, on one hand, 
the procurement regulation in BRICS and developing countries and, on the other, the high 
regulatory standards adopted in developed countries, could be mitigated by the incremental 
diffusion of alternative models of procurement governance. So far, as was explained above, 
the UNCITRAL Model Law has served as an instrument to gradually reform the national 
procurement regulations of developing countries and to progressively disperse minimum 
international standards of procurement regulation. And the renegotiation of the GPA has 
shown a tendency towards convergence in terms of the wordings and regulations of these two 
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international agreements.  
 If the TTIP imposes a new model of procurement regulation, different from or even 
more stringent than the regulatory standards shared by the GPA and the UNCITRAL Model 
Law, the risk of the fragmentation of different international instruments of procurement 
regulation, and emerging and developing economies’ regulatory marginalisation, becomes 
very significant. The regulatory convergence scenario no longer revolves around multilateral 
models of procurement regulations, such as the GPA text or the UNCITRAL Model Law, but 
instead is felt to be the initiative of single countries, and mainly the EU, to unilaterally export 
new procurement regulatory standards. 
 
5 Conclusions  
This article has examined how the field of government procurement has been approached in 
an increasing number of PTAs and in the TTIP negotiations to date. To this end, and 
regardless of the uncertain outcome of the transatlantic trade agreement’s procurement 
negotiations in the, the article has established four different modes of analysis: i) it provided 
an overview of the public procurement regulation in PTAs and explored how the PTAs’ 
discipline of public procurement has progressively integrated and disseminated the GPA 
regulatory standards of public procurement regulation; ii) it explored the impact on the 
international procurement negotiation of the internal regulations of public procurement at 
different levels of governance (federal, national and sub-national) and in both US and EU 
contexts; iii) the article underlined the innovative content of the TTIP procurement 
negotiations beyond the WTO regulation of public procurement; and, on this basis, iv) the 
article has outlined the possible implications in terms of regulatory marginalisation that could 
be suffered by developing countries. 
On the basis of these different levels of analysis, it is possible to draw some 
preliminary and more general observations, to be tested against the TTIP negotiations’ future 
development. 
1. From an institutional perspective, the ambitious and transformative TTIP 
negotiations suffer from federalist tensions. The regulatory discrepancy in the internal 
regulation of public procurement and the incoherence between central and sub-federal levels 
of procurement regulation represents crucial aspects of the transatlantic dynamic of public 
procurement negotiations. On the one hand, the considerable difference between the US’s 




hand, the level of harmonisation in the EU internal procurement market is one of the main 
factors behind the rigid negotiating position assumed by the EU in the CETA and now in the 
TTIP.  
2. The innovative and extensive TTIP negotiating agenda on public procurement – in 
terms of coverage of sub-national entities, elimination of ‘Buy American’ policies and 
inclusion of socio-environmental considerations in public procurement – has opened up a new 
scenario of fragmentation between the different international instruments of procurement 
regulation. The regulatory gap between the TTIP negotiating agenda, the GPA and the 
UNCITRAL Model Law seems destined to widen the distance between the EU and the United 
States and developing countries, which will be very difficult to overcome if and when the 
future accessions of these countries to the GPA become possible.  
3. At a more systemic level, the GPA has symbolised the main instrument of 
harmonisation of public procurement regulation, regardless of its plurilateral status inside the 
WTO framework. The text of the GPA has been used as a negotiating basis and regulatory 
model for the procurement chapters in PTAs and the parallel reform of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law extended its regulatory influence to many developing countries and transition 
economies. However, the development of an even more advanced model of procurement 
regulation, as emerging from the TTIP negotiations, seems to signal a new state of affairs: the 
regulatory marginalisation of developing countries, and a threat to the converging role that the 
GPA has tried to play so far. 
